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Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report  
(Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U)

1. (C) TERRAIN: The area of operation is predominantly mountainous terrain with the SONG VE VALLEY bisecting the area. The heavy vegetation afforded good cover and concealment but poor observation and fields of fire. The major contacts were made in the SONG VE VALLEY and NUI HON VU (HILL 464, BS 6835) areas. The main avenues of approach are Route 516 (N-S) and the SONG VE (N-S) and the SONG BA TO (N-S). Route 515 and numerous small rivers constitute the avenues east and west to the coast.
2. (U) WEATHER: The weather during Operation MALHEUR was generally favorable for military operations. Under the influence of the southwest moonsoon, the weather was characterized by westerly winds of 10-15 knots, scattered thunderstorms over the mountains, clear skies over the coastal plain. In May and June there were often large patches of ground fog in mountain valleys during the morning hours. Temperature ranged from the upper 90's during the day to the 70's at night. Relative humidity was generally in the range of 60 - 90%. Except for an occasional airstrike cancellations due to thunderstorms, the weather had no ill effect on the mission during operation MALHEUR.
3. (C) ANALYSIS:
  - a. Intelligence Analysis
    - (1) The operation was conducted against the 2d VC Regiment, 3d NVA Division and 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division. Local units were also contacted throughout the operation. Base area 122 was found not to contain significant facilities and should be deleted from active lists.
    - (2) The first phase of the operation was conducted in Base Area 124, the SONG TRA CAU VALLEY and western BA TO District. All three battalions of the 2d VC Regiment were contacted. Interrogation of prisoners and translations of documents revealed that the battalion commanders of the 93rd, 95th and 97th Battalions were killed. The enemy was found to be well fed and amply supplied with ammunition. The enemy fought well from prepared positions to protect his base camps and when he felt he had the advantage. Western BA TO District appeared to be a rear area. Supplies of new clothing and equipment were captured. Prisoners taken here identified the 107th Anti-Aircraft battalion (a new identification) to be in the area. No direct contact was made with the 107th Anti-Aircraft battalion. The enemy units were fragmented during this phase.
    - (3) In the second phase the Brigade continued to pursue to 1st VC Regiment and 2d VC Regiment. The enemy moved from base area to base area in an attempt to evade contact and regroup. The SONG VE VALLEY was cleared of civilians and cattle to deny their use to the enemy. Several large caches of rice and salt were discovered and either destroyed or evacuated. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon conducted raids in the SONG VE VALLEY to bring out people who could give information regarding conditions there. The raids revealed considerable intelligence information and resulted in the capture of a local Viet Cong political cadre leader. The enemy was believed to be concentrating in Base Area 123 and that area was again penetrated forcing the enemy to flee from the hills out onto the coastal plains. Prisoners revealed the 97th Battalion was low on food and ammunition and morale was poor. In the MO DUC Valley, the local Viet Cong Lead Quarters was attacked resulting in the District Chief and his secretary being killed, his replacement, a courier, and the production chief captured. The files of the MO DUC District were also captured.

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report  
(Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

A VC prison camp was found based on information received from a refugee and agent reports. Twenty two prisoners were freed, all of whom were Vietnamese Nationals.

b. Communication Security

- (1) During the operation a total of 108,261 radio transmissions and 6,364 conventional telephone transmissions were monitored.
- (2) A total of twenty two (22) transmission security violations were noted over the Brigade FM radio nets and 19 over the Strike switchboard.

TYPE

Disclosure of Frequency Allocations	15
Disclosure of Plans & Operations	9
Linkage or Compromise of Callsign/Callword	8
Disclosure of TDY Personnel Activities	2
Disclosure of Unit Strength	1
Disclosure of Troop Movement	2
Disclosure of Locations	2
Disclosure of Classified Information	2
Use of Unauthorized Codes	2

c. Counterintelligence

- (1) The Counterintelligence section screened detained persons at the NGHAI HANH detainee center. This screening resulted in locating 15 Viet Cong personnel, 6 weapons, 6 rice caches and 2 tunnels. Approximately 90,000 \$VN was expended for information at NGHAI HANH.
- (2) The section established a program to recover munitions dispersed by the ammunition dump fire on 20 June 1967, by offering monetary payment to local nationals for surrendering munitions. This program resulted in the recovery of 483 rounds of ammunition at an expense of approximately 39,000 \$VN.
- (3) A program has been started which will aid in the control of Vietnamese laborers within the Brigade Base Camp area. A list of all Vietnamese authorized to work within the Brigade area was obtained from the DUC PHO District Chief. Photographs are being taken of these persons. Daily spot checks of the laborers will enable this section to detect any unauthorized Vietnamese within the Brigade area.

4. (C) LESSON LEARNED

- a. Red Haze: The effect of Red Haze was reduced considerably because the natives burn their fields during the dry seasons. It was also learned through captured documents that the VC have implemented counter measures against Red Haze in the form night fire discipline which resulted in minimum use of Red Haze during Operation MALHEUR. Red Haze was not available on a responsive basis in any case.
- b. Aerial Photography: Excellent support was provided in the way of photographic coverage including trail, Landing and Drop Zones overlays throughout the entire operation. There were a few instances where we had short notice to procure photo coverage of new areas; however, because of direct telephone request to TASK FORCE OREGON, G-2, we were able to get the photography on time.
- c. Visual Reconnaissance: The overall effect of Visual Reconnaissance was good throughout the operation. However, we only had one aircraft available. Some areas could not be covered because of the requirement to have two ships in the area.

Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report  
(Operation MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

d. Use of Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon.

- (1) On two occasions the Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized to conduct raids in the SONG VE Valley. Their mission was to secure individuals knowledgeable about conditions in the valley. The first raid was highly successful in that it caught the enemy by surprise and resulted in capturing a Viet Cong Political Officer and several cooperative civilians. The second raid netted additional civilians who confirmed information obtained previously.
- (2) The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized to maintain surveillance on the SONG VE Valley, while the Brigade was operating to the West. Gunships and artillery were used to engage groups of the enemy seen in the valley.
- (3) The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon established observation over routes south of Base Area 123. Artillery was utilized to engage enemy forces trying to flee south.
- (4) An intensive training program was initiated to qualify new members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon. Night ambushes and patrols were utilized outside the base camp perimeter for familiarization in night operations resulting in several small enemy contacts.

e. Base Area and Fortification Study:

- (1) A study was undertaken to determine if patterns existed for the establishment of enemy base camps and defensive fortifications. It was found during early operation that the enemy invariably established his bases in the upper reaches of draws where water was available and dense foliage precluded aerial observation. Fortifications were found on the "fingers" covering the base camps and were mutually supporting. A comparison with information obtained from other sources such as agent reports, trail studies, etc., indicated a pattern did exist and potential base areas and bunkered positions could be predicted.
- (2) Information obtained from CICV, photos, Red Haze, Visual Reconnaissance Special Agent Report was placed on overlays and the density of activity plotted. The activity generally fell into terrain favored by the enemy for his camps. The information was then placed on maps using red to represent probable base camp locations. A careful study of surrounding terrain was made to determine likely defensive positions and these entered in blue on the map. Thus commanders were presented with a clear indication of most likely areas of interest. Exploitation using this method of locating base camps has proved to be accurate and this method of prediction will continue to be utilized where enemy activity appears to fit this pattern.

5. (C) ENEMY LOSSES: The following losses were sustained by the enemy during MALHEUR I & II.

a. Personnel:

	<u>MALHEUR I</u>	<u>MALHEUR II</u>	<u>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</u>
KIA (C)	399	470	4134
KIA Estimated	32	73	1975
POW VC/NVA	10/2	52/16	524
Detainees	220	672	4635
*VC POW	10	52	
*NVA POW	2	16	

Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report  
(Operation MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

	<u>MALHEUR I</u>	<u>MALHEUR II</u>	<u>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</u>
Civil Defandant	11	74	
Innocent Civilian	171		
Returnees	0	3	
**Unprocessed	20	17	
Body/Weapons Ratio	3.2:1	4.5:1	3.5:1
Kill Ratio	7.2:1	16.1:1	8.8:1

\*Included in POW figures

\*\*Unprocessed due to Medical Evacuation or the like reason

b. Weapons:

AK-47	15	Mosin Nagant	21
M-1 Carbine	55	M-1 Rifles	18
SKS	43	Mauser	6
K-50	9	Mas-36	19
M-16	4	Ithica	2
Bren Model MKID	1	French Model	7
MAP 49	1	Matson 9mm	2
BAR	5	M-14	3
Chicom Carbine	1	Springfield 1903	2
Chicom Type 50	5	Model 50,	14
7.62 SMG	3	Shotgun	9
Type 58 Assault	2	M-79	2
Thompson SMG	1	MG 34	1
45 Cal Pistol	6	30 Cal MG	1
38 Cal Pistol	2	M 60 MG	3
45 Cal SMG7	1	RP 46	1
Flare Pistol	2	German 7.92 MG	1
60mm Mortar	1	Chatellerault 7.5	12
82mm Mortar	4	RPD	2
<del>Flamethrower</del>	1	<del>Russian Rocket Launcher</del>	1
Pyrotech-charger	1	Russian LMG	3
#8			

c. Ammunition

Small Arms	16895 rds	Grenades	303 each
60mm Mortar	58 rds	Rockets (US)	1 each
82mm Mortars	19 rds	80mm Rockets	15 each
40mm Mortar (M-79)	2 rds	250lb bomb	2 each
3.5 in Rocket	3 rds	500lb bomb	1 each
Claymore Mines	4 rds	Chicom Mines	4 each

d. Food Stuffs

Rice	- 243 tons	Fish Oil	- 85 gal
Salt	- 133.1 tons	Corn	- 65-55 gal drums

e. Installations

Fortified bunkers - Hut complexes	58
Base Camp	32
Hospital	5

A total of 140 installations (bunker, Base Camps, Trench, Hospitals, Caves, and huts) were encountered during the operation.

f. Miscellaneous

Field Phones	-	10
Electric circuit tester	-	2
Walkie Talkie radio's	-	9
Switch board	-	20

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(Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report  
 (U) cont'd

Tape recorders	-	2
Transistor radio's	-	14
Bugle	-	2
PRC 10 radios	-	3
Gas Mask	-	1
Refrigerator	-	1
Motor Scooters	-	6
6 Cylinder Engine	-	4
Handsets	-	4
Commo Wire	-	2 miles
Switch Board Jacks	-	22
Bicycles	-	5
Speakers	-	2
Batteries BA 30	-	140
Rolls Cloth	-	30
Large amounts of medical supplies		

TABS: A - Order of Battle

B - Organization and Strength to OB

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TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U)

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle
  - a. NVA Units
    - (1) The 2nd NVA Division composed of the 1st VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Regiment, and the 21st NVA Regiment, and supporting units, was confirmed to be operating in QUANG NGAI Province. The 3rd NVA and 21st NVA Regiments were believed to be operating north of the initial area of operations. The 1st VC Regiment composed of four VC battalions was located in the vicinity of BS 550570. The subordinate battalions were believed to be located at the following positions: 40th Battalion (BS 6655), 60th Battalion (BS 5848), 70th Battalion outside the area of operations, and 90th Battalion (BS 7043).
    - (2) The 3rd NVA Division composed of the 2d VC Regiment, 18th NVA Regiment, and the 22d NVA Regiment, and supporting units, was believed to be operating in the southern portion of the initial area of operation with the division headquarters in the vicinity of BS 750280. The 2d VC Regiment, with its headquarters in the vicinity of BS 660360, was believed to be operating with the 1st VC Battalion, 2d VC Battalion, and 3rd VC Battalion in the area of operations. The 22d NVA Regiment, in the vicinity of BS 790210, was believed to be deploying. The 8th NVA Division was expected to influence the area of operations in a reinforcing role only.
  - b. VC Units:
    - (1) The 38th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion was believed to be operating in the MO DUC District (BS 7836) within Base Area 123.
    - (2) The 48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion was reported to be in the vicinity of BS 6150.
    - (3) The 409th Sapper Battalion was believed to be in the same area of operation but its location was not known.
    - (4) There are nine VC District Force (Guerrilla) companies within QUANG NGAI Province. The locations for these companies were unconfirmed.
  - c. Base Areas: There were four base camp areas reported within the area of operations. Base Area 122 SUOI DA, vicinity of BS 5649 Base Area 123 NUI COI, vicinity of BS 6545, Base Area 124 NUI VU, vicinity of BS 7623. A base area is considered a safe and secure area in which to train, rest, and regroup for combat.
2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in the Operational Area
  - a. Units not Contacted
    - (1) Elements of the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division were not contacted during Operation MALHEUR I & II, and are currently located in QUANG TIN and QUANG NAM Provinces respectively.
    - (2) Elements of the 18th and 22nd NVA Regiment, 3rd NVA Division were not contacted during the operation. The 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile had contact to the south with the 18th and 22nd NVA Regiments. The 3rd Brigade, 25th Division had contact with 22nd NVA Regiment south east of the 1st Brigade area. The 22nd NVA Regiment operated in the past in the NINH DINH-QUANG NGAI Province Border Area. The 18th NVA Regiment continues to operate south of the MALHEUR area of operations.

TMS A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

- (3) Element of the 409th Sapper Battalion were not contacted during Operation MALHEUR I & II. Although numerous reports prior to the Brigade arrival place this unit in the operational area, no contact was made with the unit, and it was consequently dropped from Order of Battle holdings. Agent reports from III MAF, Sector Intelligence in QUANG NGAI, and from Task Force Oregon placed this unit north of our area in the vicinity BS 5176. It is probably broken into small elements which are attached to other units.

b. Units with light contact

- (1) Elements of the 38th & 48th VCLF Battalions were not contacted in force during MALHEUR I & II. Based on numerous Agent Reports from higher and adjacent units, these units were probably contacted in small units. As a result of the size of the contacts, Intelligence results were insignificant. These units have as their primary interest the coastal plains area. During the operation they did not deviate from this, and are currently located north of our area, vicinity BS 6754 and BS 7382 respectively.
- (2) Small resistance groups (normally 5 to 10 personnel) which are elements of the seven district and local force units, were contacted periodically throughout the Tactical Area of Responsibility with insignificant intelligence results.

c. Units Contacted

- (1) Element of the 1st VC Regiment, and 2nd NVA Division were contacted in force during these operations. On the 15th of May 1967, Reconnaissance element of 1st Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry encountered a Battalion size force at BS 678421 which was confirmed to be a portion of the 1st VC Regiment. The result of the engagement was 20 enemy KIA (C). On 12 June Company A 1st Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry ambushed 9 enemy with documents showing them to have been members of the 60th Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment. On 15 June Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry recorded one KIA with documents that revealed he was a member of the 60th Battalion 1st NVA Regiment. On 11 July, Reconnaissance Platoon 2nd Battalion (Abn) 502d Infantry engaged an estimated company size unit. The enemy returned fire with mortars, 57mm RR and small arms. The enemy broke contact when friendly reinforcements arrived. One enemy KIA (C) and one AK-47 were found. A search of the area at daylight revealed 24 newly dug positions and numerous bloody trails, bandages and bloody clothing. A Prisoner of War captured the following day revealed that the contact had been made with elements of the 90th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment. On 26 June 1967, a Hoi Chanh revealed that the strength of the 1st VC Regiment was approximately 700 men. The Regimental Headquarters and support elements had 200 men together, the 60th Battalion had approximately 140 men, the 40th Battalion had 150, and the 90th Battalion had approximately 170 men. The Hoi Chanh also stated that the Battalions were so understrength due to losses that they were referred to as reinforced companies. Other casualties have been assessed due to the lack of reliable prisoners and documents captured during contact. The 1st VC Regimental is believed to be located northwest of our Tactical Area of Responsibility, vicinity BS 4570.

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TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

- (2) Element of the 2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division, were contacted in force during this operation. On 13 May, Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry engaged a company size unit believed to be subordinate to the 2nd VC Regiment. The results of the contact was 13 enemy KIA (C). On 18 May, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Abn) 502d Infantry contacted an estimated Battalion size force vicinity BS 710310 with a results of 25 enemy KIA (C). Based on the continued contacts with this Regiment, Regimental strength is probably about 800-900 personnel, with Battalions at a strength of approximately 200. The 2nd VC Regiment is believed to be located southeast of our Tactical Area of Responsibility, vicinity BS 7728 and BS 8044.
  - (3) Final Disposition of the 1st & 2nd VC Regiments:
    - (a) 1st NVA Regiment Headquarters vicinity BS 5269
      - 1 40th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 6547
      - 2 60th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 4767
      - 3 70th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity TIEN PHUOC/TAM KY
      - 4 90th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 4566
    - (b) 2nd NVA Regiment Headquarters - vicinity BS 629364
      - 1 93rd Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 7728
      - 2 95th Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 6254
    - (c) 97th Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 8044
  - (4) The friendly operations initiated during Operations MALHEUR I & II have reduced the enemy's combat effectiveness. Interrogation of Prisoners of War and returnee reports indicate that the enemy's combat effectiveness has further been reduced due to illness, desertions, friendly Air Strikes and ground operations. The VC units have been forced to split into small groups to avoid contact with friendly ground forces, while attempting to regroup in safer areas to the northwest and southeast. Morale has been another factor which influenced the combat effectiveness of the enemy units. As reported from Interrogation of Prisoners of War and returnees, morale is poor among the low echelon cadre for many of the above reasons. The enemy units have the capability of regrouping and becoming a limited threat when the terrain and defensive posture is to their advantage, and they should be viewed accordingly.
  - (5) See TAB B Order of Battle Information pertaining to Organization and strength of the 1st and 2nd NVA Regiments.
- d. New Units Contacted: 107 Anti Aircraft Battalion (Also Known As 270th Battalion)
- (1) History

Infiltration: In December 66, the 270th Battalion (Also Known as 107th) moved to LA Hamlet, NHO QUAN District, HOA BINH Province, where the member of the Battalion moved in with the local populace, in an

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T.B A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

effort to avoid being bombed. After one month, every-one was given a 10 day leave, to report back to LA Hamlet, not later than 17 January 67, the Battalion began its infiltration march, which took four months, and it was all by foot. The unit crossed the Demilitarized Zone, entered LAOS and then worked down through THUA THIEN, QUANG TIN, and into QUANG NGAI Province. The unit stopped for one day of rest every fifth day. The Battalion finally set up, for the first time on 26 May 67, after arriving in QUANG NGAI Province. They set up in a valley approximately a two day walk south or southeast of BS 503433.

(2) Training and Tactics

(a) The battalion was formed and training begun in late April 1966. The officers and Non Commissioned Officers for the Battalion were drawn from the 42nd and 50th Regiments, 350th Division. This division is responsible for the defense of HAI PHONG. The battalion first had to build its camp, which was located in the mountains of VU BAN (District), HOA BINH (Province). The first two days of training were devoted to basic infantry training, with the SKS rifle. Each man fired five rounds at a 50 meter target. They also received instructions in grenades and the use of the bayonet. For the following six months, all training was devoted to the 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun.

1 First Month: Disassembling, assembling, cleaning and care of the weapon.

2 Second Month: Carrying the weapon and preparations for battle. When the unit is moving, the weapon is broken down, for carrying, as follows: The Assistant Squad Leader carries an extra barrel, if available. The Battalion currently has an extra barrel for each of it nine (9) Heavy Machine Guns. The Squad leader carries the sights. One man carries the tripod, one the wheels. All nine weapons in the 107th Battalion are complete, with wheels. Three men carry the firing mechanism and barrel. The rest of the personnel carry ammunition. The 107TH Battalion currently has 200 rounds per weapon. During the infiltration march, an unknown amount was lost. Soon after their arrival in QUANG NGAI (Province), they were resupplied to bring the supply to its present level.

3 Third thru Sixth Month: Setting up positions, use of field of fire, support of infantry in both defense and attack, employment against Armored Personnel Carrier and convoys. Each man fired 28 rounds, during training, on a 300 meter range, at an opening in a wooden board, the opening being 25mm x 75mm. They fired once during daylight and once at night, each time firing one burst of five rounds and one of nine rounds.

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TAB (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation  
After Action Report (Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

(b) Employment:

- 1 The 107th Battalion constructs its positions as follows: There is no mound in the middle to set the gun on. The walls of the bunker are 1.60 meters high and 0.80 meters thick. The inside diameter is 3.00 meters. In bivouac, the three companies set up in triangular pattern, with the Battalion Command Post in the center. Each unit is about three minutes walk apart.
- 2 Within each company, the three weapons are also set up in a triangular pattern, with three positions prepared for each weapon. Distance between each of these positions is approximately 500 meters. The primary and alternate positions are well camouflaged. None of the positions are occupied. The gun team waits a safe distance from the primary position. If the positions are bombed, they feel sure a heliborne attack will follow. After the bombing, they then occupy the primary position and commence fire when the helicopters come within range. Before the helicopters land, however, the gun teams withdraw to the alternate positions.

(c) Communications:

In the North Viet Nam, the Battalion used field phones for communication between the company, and the battalion; however they did not bring any to South Viet Nam and must rely on messengers.

3. (C) COMPOSITION:

- a. In North Viet Nam, the 320B Division is part of the III Corps. Unknown number of Division make up the Corps.
- b. The 320B Division has three Regiments, however the 3rd Regiment is the only one about which information is known.
- c. The 3rd Regiment consists of 10 battalions.
  - (1) The 301st, 302d Infantry Battalions.
  - (2) The 269th, 270th, 271st and 272d Anti Aircraft Battalions.
  - (3) The 270th (also known as 107th) Anti Aircraft Battalion has three companies numbered 1, 2 and 3.
  - (4) Each company has two platoons, numbered 1 and 2.
  - (5) Each platoon has three squads. The squad in the 1st platoon are numbered 1, 2 and 3. Those in the 2d platoon are numbered 4, 5 and 6.
  - (6) Each squad has three cells.

4. (C) STRENGTH (Weapons):

	In North Viet Nam	In South Viet Nam
Anti Aircraft Battalion	500	350
Anti Aircraft Company	144	110
Platoon	63	45-47
Squad	20	10-15

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TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

5. (C) STRENGTH (Weapons):

- a. Every two squads in the Battalion 1 x 12.7 Heavy Machine Gun, total of 9.
- b. Company level officers and above have K-45 pistols.
- c. Platoon leaders, assistant platoon leaders and squad leaders have M-58s.
- d. Other personnel do not have small arms because they must carry parts of the Heavy Machine Guns when unit is moving.


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
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


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Tab B (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (MALHEUR)(U)

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
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Tab D (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 (Operation Schematic) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR



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
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Tab G (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 (Operations Schematic) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MFOE)	4510
Assigned	4887
Present for Duty	4496
Airhead - DUC PHO	3642
Base Camp - PHAN RANG	854
Not Present for Duty	391

(2) The assigned strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 99% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 37 were hospitalized, 48 were intransit, 157 were on TDY/SD status, 124 on leave, 18 in confinement, and 12 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MFOE)	4510
Assigned	4648
Present for Duty	4316
Airhead - DUC PHO	3496
Base Camp - PHAN RANG	820
Not Present for Duty	330

(2) The assigned strength was 104% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 96% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 28 were hospitalized, 34 were intransit, 130 were on TDY/SD status, 117 on leave, 15 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

c. Beginning of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MFOE)	4510
Assigned	4626
Present for Duty	4306
Airhead - DUC PHO	3488
Base Camp - PHAN RANG	818
Not Present for Duty	320

(2) The assigned strength was 102% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 95% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 24 were hospitalized, 44 were intransit, 118 were on TDY/SD status, 110 on leave, 18 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

d. Conclusion of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4510
Assigned	5087
Present for Duty	4736
Airhead - DUC PHO	3906
Base Camp - PHAN RANG	830
Not Present for Duty	351

(2) The assigned strength was 112% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 104% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 21 were hospitalized, 54 were intransit, 123 were on TDY/SD status, 137 on leave, 10 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

e. Replacements received during Phase I of the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>		<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
1-327	2	75	2-320	8	53
2-327	2	53	Spt Bn	13	37
2-502	4	89	Separate Co	17	71

f. Replacements received during Phase II of the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>		<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
1-327	6	41	2-320	6	18
2-327	6	54	Spt Bn	12	32
2-502	1	30	Separate Co	14	59

g. Total replacements received for Operation MALHEUR were: 703.

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for Phase I of the operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>
HHC LRRP	1	7
1-327	25	156
2-327	2	39
2-502	14	89
2-320	1	16
A/2-17 Cav	0	5
A/326 Engr	1	4
42 Inf (SD)	1	2
TOTAL	45	308

b. Casualties for Phase II of the operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>
HHC LRRP	1	1
1-327	7	81
2-327	15	74
2-502	9	81
2-320	1	17
A/2-17 Cav	0	5
A/326 Engr	2	16
42 Inf (SD)	1	1
TOTAL	36	276

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c. Total casualties for Operation MALHEUR were:

<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
81	594	1

d. Total casualties to date:

<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
473	2562	3

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Units from PHAN RANG and CHU LAI continued their visits to forward units during the operation.

b. A Red Cross representative was located in the Brigade Forward Echelon during Operation MALHEUR.

c. Records checks were conducted by AG in the forward area during the operation.

d. During this period one USO show visited the forward area to entertain the troops. There were two performances by the show.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: Planning during the period involved the following areas.

a. During the months of May, June and July, the Brigade rotated approximately 1583 personnel to CONUS receiving 2777 replacements. At this time the Brigade rotational hump is over and the personnel posture of the Brigade is excellent.

b. Assistant Brigade S-1 initiated a system of monthly visits to USARV Headquarters to deliver requisition and discuss and plan officer replacements.

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Inclousure 5 ( Chemical Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (C) MISSION: To conduct Chemical ground and air assault operation against VC/NVA forces operating within ZON AO and to employ riot control agents to harass and demoralize civilians under VC/NVA influence in conjunction with psychological warfare operations.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. General: Chemical operations during Operation MALHEUR consisted of area denial, tunnel flushing/denial, CS gas grenade drops, and rice and salt contamination. All operations were conducted by the 20th Chemical Detachment under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

b. Area denial operations: During Operation MALHEUR a total of 10 area denial operations were conducted, utilizing 5320 lbs of bulk CS-1. A brief resume of each operations is as follows:

(1) On the morning of 7 June A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a VC base camp concealed in dense jungle vicinity BS677392. This target was hit by the 20th Chemical Detachment 071430H June 1967. 480 lbs of bulk CS-1 were spread over a circular area with a 200 meter radius from target center. All CS bags detonated properly placing a heavy concentration within the target area.

(2) 071530H June 1967 vicinity BS686384 a VC base camp was attacked with bulk CS-1. A total of 480 lbs of CS-1 was delivered on the target covering a circular area with a 200 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(3) 091500H June 1967 vicinity BS678378 an enemy defensive network consisting of numerous 2 and 3-man fighting holes and several bunkers was attacked. 800 lbs of CS-1 was delivered on the target. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(4) 161615H June 1967 vicinity BS681400 a VC base camp was attacked with 240 lbs of bulk CS-1 contaminating a circular area 150 meters from target center. Supported unit: B Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(5) 191400H June 1967 vicinity BS683435 a VC base camp surrounded by trenches and numerous 2 and 3-man fighting holes was attacked. 800 lbs of CS-1 was dropped, placing a heavy concentration of CS in the target area. Supported unit: C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(6) 200830H June 1967 vicinity BS680443 240 lbs of CS-1 was delivered in a VC base camp, contaminating a circular area on the ground in a 150 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(7) 260930H June 1967 a VC base camp and bunker complex extending from BS596577 to BS582568 was discovered. 800 lbs of CS-1 was delivered on this target. A new type of plastic container for the 8 lb package of CS-1 was dropped to ascertain effect of det cord and ground impact on containers. A minimum of 1 turn of det cord will disrupt the container. Containers will rupture upon impact with the ground when dropped from 1500 feet.

(8) The CG, 1-101, directed that a frequently used agress route north from SONG VE Valley be attacked with bulk CS-1 on 5 July. On the morning of 5 July the route was reconnoitered and a section of 250 meters through the MO DUC Pass was selected. East of this section of the route was a 50-100 foot drop into a deep gully, while to the west the ground sharply rose to a height of approximately 1200 feet. 800 lbs of CS-1 were dropped on this section of the road. The area was placed under observation for two (2) days. A total of 17 people were observed approaching the contaminated area. 3 individuals riding bicycles traversed the area. All others turned back. It could not be determined if personnel riding bicycles wore some type of protective mask. Supported unit: 1-101.

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Inclosure 5 (Chemical Operations) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

(9) 291430H July 1967 vicinity BS681495 - BS682480, a valley containing a VC base camp and trails along a river bank was attacked. 240 lbs of CS-1 was dropped on the trail along the river bank and VC base camp. Supported unit: 1-101.

(10) 300930H July 1967 valley vicinity BS646454 frequently used by VC was attacked. 480 lbs of CS-1 was used on the target area. The mouth of the valley was contaminated with a high concentration of CS; the valley was seeded for a distance of 660 meters north from coordinates BS646454.

c. CS Gas Grenades Drops:

(1) The initial CS grenades drop during Operation MALHEUR occurred 061600H June 1967 vicinity BS604417. The target was an unknown number of snipers in a treeline, and the mission was flown at the request of B Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Three passes were made upwind of the target area, producing a line source approximately 400 meters each pass. A dense CS cloud drifted over the target area, remaining in the area for 20-30 minutes. The CS strike was immediately followed by TAC Air. A total of 330 M7A3 grenades were dropped during this strike.

(2) On 110900H June 1967, B Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry encountered an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions along a steep ridge line vicinity coordinates BS609460. At 110000H June 1967 the enemy was attacked with CS gas grenades. The initial drop at 1000 hours showed lapse conditions which caused the CS cloud to rise. Subsequent passes were made further down the sides of the ridge to allow the CS cloud to drift up the ridge. The target was covered and the enemy abandoned their positions. Total amount of M7A3 CS grenades used were 400.

(3) 161555H June 1967 A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received intense automatic weapons fire from vicinity BS584573. An immediate airstrike was requested, however the airstrike would be preceded by a CS gas grenade drop to cause the enemy to flee his fortified positions, thereby making him more vulnerable to the airstrike. To insure also dropped CS concentration would remain in the target area, 30 8 lb CS bags were also dropped on the target. The first drop was the CS grenades, which commenced 161710H June 1967. They were dropped on three passes from BS581572 to BS588572, producing a dense concentration upwind of the target. The agent drifted upslope over the target area. 385 M7A3 CS grenades were dropped on the target. The CS bags were dispersed in a stream bed from BS582575 to BS592577 in three passes. The CS bag drop was immediately followed by an airstrike.

(4) Early in the morning of 30 June 1967, C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry received sniper fire from a well concealed enemy vicinity BS591495. A CS gas grenade drop was requested. The CS gas grenade drop commenced 300730H June 1967, with a total of 630 M7A3 CS grenades being dropped on the target. The grenades were dropped in two sorties and 15 low level (100-200 feet) passes. Strike was directed by unit on the ground and Command and Control helicopter. 252 grenades were dropped on likely routes of withdrawal, while the remaining 378 were dropped on the sniper position. A very heavy concentration was produced in the vicinity of each drop but calm wind conditions allowed agent cloud to rise instead of producing desired downwind coverage. C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry assaulted the enemy positions following the strike.

(5) The Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon observed several VC in a village vicinity BS600511 and called for an Artillery strike. The Artillery strike was preceded by a CS gas grenade drop at 031330H July 1967. 252 M7A3 CS grenades were dropped on the village in three passes. A heavy concentration covered the target area. 1 VC ran from the village and was engaged with gunships providing cover for the gas ship. Immediately following the strike the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon called in Artillery on the village.

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Inclosure 5 (Chemical Operations) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

(6) A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received small arms fire from a village vicinity BS664578 at 311323 July 1967. To get to the village required the unit to cross an open area approximately 100 meters wide surrounding the village. Artillery was called in, but the small arms fire continued. At 311400H July 1967 a CS gas drop was requested. The target was attacked at 311445H July 1967 utilizing 378 M7A3 CS grenades. Gunships fired on the village continuously to suppress the enemy fire during the strike. After the first pass over the target with CS, all firing on the gas ship ceased. Two additional passes were made. A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (masked) assaulted across the open area and engaged the enemy.

d. Tunnel flushing/denial operations: During Operation MALHEUR 8 tunnel flushing/denial operations were conducted. Data on each operation is as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>AMOUNT OF BULK CS USED</u>
3 Jun 67	A/2-17 Cav	16 lbs
8 Jun 67	A/2-17 Cav	64 lbs
9 Jun 67	A/2-17 Cav	40 lbs
1 Jul 67	A/1-327th Inf	80 lbs
10 Jul 67	A/2-17th Cav	240 lbs
26 Jul 67	A/2-327th Inf	80 lbs
27 Jul 67	C/2-327th Inf	80 lbs

e. Destruction of Salt Cache: An 80 ton rock salt cache was discovered on 28 June 1967 by A Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry vicinity BS624424. It was not tactically feasible to extract the salt and it was decided upon to destroy the salt in place. 20 8 lb bags of CS were dispersed throughout the cache and blown simultaneously with a cratering charge spreading the salt and CS throughout the area. On 291430H June 1967 an additional 480 lbs of CS was dropped on the cache from the air. A low level flight was made over the area on 6 August 1967. The CS concentration was still heavy and there were no signs of activity in the area or that any of the salt had been removed.

3. (C) Results: Tunnel flushing/denial, CS gas grenade drops, and Salt/Rice Cache Contamination/Destruction operations were considered satisfactory. An evaluation of the effectiveness of area denial operations continues to be a major problem. This is due to the fact we do not place the area under observation after the strikes nor do we enter the area to determine the intensity of the CS concentration. Tactical units have come upon areas three to four weeks after their contamination with CS-1 and found the concentration too strong to operate without protective masks which is indirect proof that the desired results are probably being attained.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

- a. Rice/Salt Caches can be effectively destroyed with bulk CS-1 powder.
- b. Sniper fire from villages and concealed positions in woodlines can be suppressed with non-persistent CS gas.

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (U) Phase I

a. General: Two significant Civil Affairs operations were conducted during Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The first operation involved the resettlement of Vietnamese civilians within the CARENTAN Base perimeter to a hamlet at the Southern portion of the Brigade Area. The villagers were allowed to take their personal belongings with them. This movement required 109 2½ ton truck loads. Roofing tin was supplied by CORDS. Food was supplied to the people during the movement period. An access road to the new hamlet was constructed by Brigade Engineers who also laid out roads in the hamlet. MEDCAP's were conducted for the people and veterinary services provided for their animals. The project took three weeks to complete. Upon its completion security within the perimeter was enhanced.

(2) The second operation involved the return of 24 cattle and 25 water buffalo to DUC PHO District. These animals had been sighted in the area of operations by the ground combat elements. Since the area was located in Viet Cong territory, a decision was made to return the livestock to the refugees that had previously departed. One platoon of DUC PHO Popular Forces was airlifted into the Area of Operations and subsequently herded the cattle to District Headquarters.

b. Resume of Phase I Operations:

- (1) 420 Refugees relocated within CARENTAN Base.
- (2) 114 Innocent Civilians, apprehended in combat operations, were returned to their homes.
- (3) 305 persons Medically Treated.
- (4) 30 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
- (5) 21 Cattle returned to government control.
- (6) 25 Water Buffalo returned to government control.

2. (U) Phase II:

a. General: During Phase II Civil Affairs operations centered on Refugee Movement and Control, Food Extraction, Livestock Evacuation, and MEDCAP Operations.

b. Refugee Movement and Control: During Phase II a total of 8465 refugees were evacuated from the Area of Operations. The majority of refugees went to a Refugee Center at NGHIA HANH while the remainder were divided among Refugee Centers at MINH LONG, BA TO, and MO DUC. At the request of the Province Chief the Brigade evacuated the populations of the SONG VE, SONG NE, and MO DUC Valleys. The people were evacuated by helicopter and were allowed to take only the personal possessions they could carry with them. Province officials and CORDS insured that adequate space and building material was on hand in each refugee center to satisfy the needs of the people. Following the evacuation of the refugees all structures were burned to deny their use to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces in the area. This also discouraged refugees from returning to their homes after having been evacuated.

c. Food Extraction: During Phase II, 79.5 tons of unpolished rice and 27.5 tons of salt were extracted from the Area of Operations and returned to government control. In most extraction operations a labor force was provided by District officials while the Brigade supplied security and airlift.

d. Livestock Evacuation: Concurrent with the evacuation of the population from the SONG VE VALLEY the tactical units herded a total of 1149 cattle and 192 water buffalo out of the valley. These livestock were turned over to the NGHIA HANH and MINH LONG District Chiefs for redistribution to the evacuated refugees.

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e. MEDCAP: During Phase II, 1974 persons were treated in MEDCAP operations. While directly benefiting the people these operations also helped build the GVN image and provided our forces with a limited intelligence source. 60

f. Resume of Phase II Operations:

1. 8465 Refugees evacuated.
2. 399 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
3. 1974 persons Medically Treated.
4. 79.5 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
5. 27.5 tons of Salt returned to government control.
6. 1149 Cattle returned to government control.
7. 192 Water Buffalo returned to government control.
8. 183 Chickens returned to government control.
9. 88 Ducks returned to government control.
10. 66 Pigs returned to government control.
11. 156 Animals treated.

3. (U) Conclusions:

- a. No problems were encountered which required major outside support to solve.
- b. Prior coordination with Sub-Sector, Sector and CORDS representatives is essential to a smooth running Civil Affairs/Civic Action Program.

4. (U) Total Operation MALHEUR Statistics:

- a. 8885 Refugees evacuated.
- b. 513 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
- c. 2279 persons Medically Treated.
- d. 109.5 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
- e. 27.5 tons of Salt returned to government control.
- f. 1173 Cattle returned to government control.
- g. 217 Water Buffalo returned to government control.
- h. 183 Chickens returned to government control.
- i. 88 Ducks returned to government control.
- j. 66 Pigs returned to government control.
- k. 156 Animals treated.

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UNIT 7 (Communications) to Combat After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR

1. (B) Mission: The First Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had the joint mission of providing signal support for the brigade.

2. (C) Operations:

a. General: The 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided signal support during Operation MALHEUR I and II by establishing the Brigade Command Post and Communications Systems at DUC PHO.

b. The brigade VHF Section was not used during Operation MALHEUR I and II.

c. Communications Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at DUC PHO

d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade Command Post at DUC PHO terminating 120 circuits and installed approximately 55 miles of wire.

e. FM Radio Section provided FM Radio, Secure and Radio Wire Integration Stations at DUC PHO. An automatic retransmission and relay station was employed at BS564448. The MARS Station was established to provide phone patch service to the United States.

f. AM Radio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between DUC PHO and PHAN RANG. A secure teletype circuit between the Forward Support Element at DUC PHO and the Forward Support Platoon at MINH LONG was established to assist the Support Battalion.

g. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

h. Task Force Oregon Signal Support: Company A, 36th Signal Battalion provided circuits into the in-country system, secure radio teletype between Task Force Oregon and Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear.

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Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (U) The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during Operations MALHEUR I and II. General support was provided by elements of 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery.

2. (C) Summary of Operations:

a. In the conduct of Operations MALHEUR I and II, the same techniques of artillery support that have proven successful in the past were employed. Terrain did permit the use of radar outside the base camp and the radar was successfully helilifted on two occasions, once during Operation LAKE and once during MALHEUR II.

b. In view of the great distances between firing batteries and base camp, the battalion Fire Direction Center functioned as a control/coordination agency only and conducted no technical fire direction. A Liaison Section was provided by the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery to coordinate all general support fires of that unit and Battery C (8"/175), 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery. The Battalion FDC was positioned at CARENTAN Base Camp and continuous communications were maintained with all elements without the use of a relay.

c. A fire base, (Fire Base CHAMPS), was established during MALHEUR II to provide light and medium fire support throughout the major portion of the area of operations. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery occupied the base by helilift on 7 June 1967 and remained until 27 July 1967. During the period Battery B supported 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry and Battery C reinforced fires of the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. Security of the base was provided by one company of 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry, and later replaced by a company of 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry. A collocated Fire Direction Center was successfully used and facilitated fire coordination.

d. Additional forward observer requirements were imposed with the attachment of CIDG companies to maneuver battalions. These parties were provided from organic sections and the battalion headquarters. Two additional liaison personnel were required by Task Force OREGON at the BATO and MINH LONG Special Forces Camps. Personnel were taken from battalion FDC to fill this commitment, however, radios could not be provided in all cases.

3. (U) Execution:

a. A/2-320th displacements:

(1) On 110830 May, A Btry displaced by air to BS62093700. Unit closed at 1225 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

(2) On 190800 May, A Btry displaced by air to BS63363799. Unit closed at 1128 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry, and 2/327th Infantry.

(3) On 160935 Jun, A Btry displaced by air to BS613583. Unit closed at 1515 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

(4) On 290930 Jun, A Btry displaced by air to BS488367. Unit closed at 1420 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

(5) On 031000 Jul, A Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base at BS84063715. Unit closed at 1520 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

(6) On 140900 Jul, A Btry displaced by air to BS58265805. Unit closed 1400 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

b. B/2-320th displacements:

(1) On 190730 May, B Btry displaced by air to BS730328. Unit closed at 1208 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

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