

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 2D BATTALION (AIRBORNE), 502D INFANTRY  
APO SF 96347

AVED-CC

28 July 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: MALHEUR I, MALHEUR II

TO: Commanding General  
1st Bde. 101st Abn Div  
ATTN: AVED-C  
APO SF 96347

1. GENERAL:

a. Name of Operation: MALHEUR I, MALHEUR II.

b. Dates of Operation: MALHEUR I, 11 May - 4 June 1967; MALHEUR II, 7 June - 28 July 1967.

c. Location: MALHEUR I & II, Quang Ngai Province.

d. Control Headquarters: Hqs, 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf.

e. Reporting Officer: Harry A. Buckley, COL, Infantry.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: MALHEUR I: Ref 2-502 OPORD 22-67.  
MALHEUR II: Ref 2-502 OPORD 25-67.

3. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Army Aviation was used for troop movement, gunship coverage, medical evacuation, refugee relocation, psywar operations, resupply activities, visual reconnaissance, and command and control missions. Despite numerous instances of effective small arms fire, Army aviators did an outstanding job in support of the STRIKE FORCE. Lack of aircraft presented some difficulties in the latter stages of the operation, but the need for medical evacuation was always answered immediately, and a great number of casualties were lifted out of thickly vegetated areas where no LZ's were available. During MALHEUR I and II, 2-502 conducted 4 battalion size moves, 8 company size moves, and 18 platoon size moves using Army Aviation. During MALHEUR II over 1300 refugees were relocated from the Song Ve and Song Ba To Valley to Ngia Hanh with a minimum of delay and suffering.

b. Tac Air was used against probable enemy base camp areas on a number of occasions. It was also employed in support of ground troops, proving to be accurate and effective when in close proximity to a friendly force. During MALHEUR I the 2-502 called in 13 airstrikes; during MALHEUR II, 54 airstrikes took place.

c. Artillery was used throughout the operation. Statistics on total number of missions are unavailable.

d. The Engineer platoon attached to the TAC CP did an excellent job in building FINE BASE CHALPS. Construction of bunkers, command installations, ammunition storage areas, roads, as well as laying of defensive wire, was accomplished quickly and effectively. Throughout all phases of the operation the Engineer clearing teams attached to the rifle companies performed an important mission in clearing LZ's, destroying mines and booby traps, and denying tunnel systems and bunker complexes.

e. Dog teams were attached to the maneuver elements throughout the operation. On several occasions scout dogs alerted friendly elements to the presence of VC before the enemy was sighted or engaged. One scout dog was killed by friendly Artillery.

f. An MP squad was of great assistance during the cordon and search of the villages in MALHEUR II. It was used to control the large numbers of refugees collected at the evacuation point.

g. Psywar support played a large role in Operation MALHEUR due to the numbers of non-combatants encountered during the operation. Particularly in BASTOGNE AO, psywar efforts saved the lives of many civilians and were partially responsible for the relatively smooth evacuation of the Song Ve Valley. Psywar loudspeaker teams were employed on the ground as well as in the air, for a total of 17 hours. 6,517,000 leaflets were dropped, and it is significant to note that a number of people came down from their hiding places in the mountains with safe-conduct passes held above their heads.

h. The LRRP platoon supported the STRIKE FORCE by conducting quick raids on select targets, monitoring routes of entry and egress, and herding and driving cattle up the Song Ve Valley as part of Operation RAWHIDE.

i. Naval gunfire was used in limited H & I roles. It did not play a significant part in operations, however, as there was complete coverage in all AO's by artillery fans.

j. MI teams were of assistance in screening VCS from the civilian populace, and in the interrogation of suspects and POW's. On several occasions, the immediate use of MI personnel in questioning a VCS led to the discovery of caches containing weapons and other equipment.

k. A Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) from Ngia Hanh assisted in clearing the Song Ve Valley. Their prior knowledge of the area and acquaintance with the people eliminated some of the confusion inherent in such an operation.

l. CIDG units from Ba To and Minh Long participated with varying degrees of success in search and destroy operations under 2-502 OPCON.

4. INTELLIGENCE: During Operation MALHEUR, the 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf was employed in the southern area of Quang Ngai Province, to search and destroy subordinate units of the MR5 Headquarters operating there consisted of the following units:

1st VC Regiment

2nd VC Regiment of the 3rd  
NVA Division

21st NVA Regiment

409th Sapper Battalion

The Area of Operation was believed to contain numerous enemy establishments, to include hospitals, training centers, headquarters elements, and well used commo-liaison routes for interprovince country movements.

The STRIKE FORCE made contact throughout the 25 day period, resulting in 133 VC FIA (BC), 19 NVA (BC), 3 NVA POW, 6 detainees. The weapons captured during this time consisted of: 15 SKS, 2 M-1, 1 flamethrower, 1 German 7.92 model MG, 6 Mosin Nugent, 8 carbines, 2 MAS 36, 1 Chicom SMG, 1 pistol 45 cal, 1 pistol 38 cal, 1 French SMG, 1 mortar (82), 2 SMG 50 modified, 1 semi-auto weapon, 1 M-16, 2 M-14, 1 modified type 49 MAT, 2 PPSH 41.

The majority of the contacts were made by platoons of the STRIKE FORCE conducting Recondo Checkerboard operations along likely avenues of approach and suspected supply routes.

The following rice caches were discovered while searching the AO:

1. BS 695333 800 lbs unhulled rice
2. BS 748303 500 lbs unhulled rice
3. BS 787327 54 tons unhulled rice

Miscellaneous items discovered during the operation consisted of 19 rds 82mm mortar, 9 Chicom grenades, rucksacks, load bearing equipment, medical supplies, 2 radios, assorted ammo, and documents.

Further evidence of the Viet Cong usage of the Quang Ngai Providence was gained in the discovery of numerous hootch complexes, camp sites, and several well fortified camps in the area. The most significant of these are: at BS 645332 B Company found an extensive base camp with living quarters, 35 fortified bunkers, and underground tunnels with living quarters. At BS 695333 E Company found a base camp with 10 hootches, 16 bunkers, and 3 tunnels. At BS 707324 C Company and at BS 707327 B Company, both in heavy contact, found a fortified camp with numerous spider holes, with overhead cover, and a hootch complex. At BS 708320 A Company found a hootch complex of 20 hootches. All of the above areas indicated they had been prepared for several months and used recently.

The enemy force engaged during the above period of time appeared to have been armed with the following type weapons: 82mm mortars, SKS's, and assorted US and foreign made light machine guns and small arms. The enemy fought with great tenacity, and his tactics were professional in nature. Evidence indicates that the enemy force encountered were Viet Cong with NVA personnel intermingled. This assumption is based upon the type of weapons and equipment captured and the enemy's method of operation. The enemy moved primarily along secondary and tertiary trails which were found generally along stream beds.

The first phase of MALHEUR II was conducted from 7 through 24 June against enemy forces in the northwestern area of Quang Ngai Province, the enemy force operating in the area of operations was estimated to be at least a Regimental Headquarters with 3 battalions. Information obtained from 1 NVA POW indicated the enemy in the area was Viet Cong with NVA personnel intermingled.

The weapons encountered and the tactics used by the enemy forces were those normally associated with main force Viet Cong units.

The STRIKE FORCE made contact throughout the 18 day period resulting in 56 VC (BC), 86 detainees, and 1404 refugees extracted from the Song Ve Valley area to Nghia Hinh refugee camp. The weapons captured during the same period, consisted of: 1 SKS, 1 MAS 36, 1 Mosin Nugent, 2 mortar (82), 1 SMG modified 50, 1 modified 49 MG, 2 flare pistols, 1 LAW, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 LSMG, 5 carbines, 2 shotguns.

Two rice caches were discovered by the STRIKE FORCE and destroyed while searching the area of operation: one cache containing 1 ton of unhulled rice stored in an extensive cave complex at BS 613476. Another cache of 4 tons unhulled rice was found at BS 618458 stored in 2 bunkers.

During the operation several well fortified base camps, numerous bunker positions, and several hospital and hootch complexes were discovered in the area of operation. The most significant of these were as follows: at BS 608453 A Company found 25 hootches, 3 large kitchens, 30 spider holes and bunkers. Located under the hootches were tunnels that would serve approximately 150 personnel. At BS 607467 C Company discovered a base camp with 10 hootches, sleeping quarters with overhead cover, and 10 firing positions, five with overhead cover.

Miscellaneous items discovered during the operation consisted of 8 rds 82mm mortar, 8 rds 60mm mortar, electric circuit tester, 4 walkie talkie radios, 9 HB3FP-pt handsets, 6TA 312 telephones, 1 switchboard (oriental make), 1 long antenna, 1 short antenna, 2 tripods, 1 tape recorder with tape, 45 assorted fuses and tubes, 1 bugle, 3 transistor radios, assorted ammo, clothing, webbing, and documents.

The enemy moved primarily along secondary and tertiary trails which were found generally along stream beds and near the Song Ve Valley area.

The second phase of MALHEUR was conducted 25 June 67 through 28 July 67. The assigned mission was to search and destroy VC/NVA forces and neutralize VC/NVA base camps in the AO. The enemy forces, through captured documents and information obtained from POW's, disclosed evidence of the nomenclature of units operating within the area (see enemy units, Incl #2).

The STRIKE FORCE made contact throughout the 34 day period resulting in 131 VC (BC), 4 NVA (DC), 40 VC POW's, 77 detainees, and 338 refugees extracted from the AO. The weapons captured during the period consisted of 5 carbines, 1 Springfield rifle, 4 Mosin Nugent, 2 AK-47, 4 MAS 36, 4 SKS, 1 BAR, 1 light MG, 2 shotguns, 2 pistol 45, 2 modified 50 SMG, 1 mortar 60mm, 1 MG 30 cal, 3 M-1.

The following rock salt and rice caches were destroyed while searching in the AO.

1. BS 609408 4 tons unhulled rice
2. BS 585482 3 tons unhulled rice
3. BS 612423 200 lbs unhulled rice
4. BS 625423 60 tons rock salt

On 17 July 1967 the STRIKE FORCE screened and established blocking positions along avenues of escape from 1652 Strike area, along the southern and western portions of ZON AO. Throughout the 4 days spent in the area, sporadic contact was made resulting in 6 VC KIA, 5 detainees, 2 VCC, 1 Mosin Nugent, 1 shotgun and 1 pistol 45.

On 19 July 1967 acting on intelligence from a reliable source a platoon from A Company 1-327 OPCON to 2-502 was helilifted in an area at BS 570470 to search and destroy a POW complex reported in the area. The complex was located at 0930 hours, guarded by 7 VC's armed with 5 carbines and 2 SMG; who fled south after the initial contact. The friendly forces found 22 Vietnamese being held captive, 12 of these being detained in shackles. Further search of the area disclosed 12 hootches, 2 tunnels, each 20 feet long, 1 shotgun, 1 blackboard, 1 ton of corn bagged and marked NATO 1967, documents and clothing. Information obtained from the released prisoners indicated that 1 armed guard had taken a 7 man work detail out early that morning and 15 days prior an armed guard had taken an all man work party to look for food; neither had returned. One released prisoner indicated he had been held captive for two years. The complex was destroyed and the released prisoners evacuated to Brigade Headquarters (Incl #2).

Miscellaneous items discovered during the operation consisted of 23-82mm mortar rds, 4-81mm mortar rds, 3 tons bound paper, 10-60mm mortar rds, 12 Chicom grenades, 2 M-26 grenades, 2 57 RR rds, RPD magazines, 150 rds 30.06 ammo, 3-82mm mortar bases, 2 60mm mortar sights, 1 HMG tripod, 1 scope, 8 BARR magazines, 750 rds 30 cal ammo, 5 M5 fuses, 1 60mm mortar fuse, 2 blocks Chicom TNT, AK-47 ammo, 5 shotgun shells, webbing equipment, clothing and medical supplies, rucksacks and documents.

During the operation one well fortified base camp was discovered by C Company at BS 615428 consisting of 20 caves with tunnel complexes, 10 hootches and numerous bunker positions with overhead cover (Incl #2). At BS 612428 C Company found 2 hootches with 24 bunkers; at BS 501430 B Company discovered a campsite that would accomodate approximately 150 people.

#### ENEMY UNITS

##### Military Region 5 Hqs.

Unit 130 (Quang Ngai Providence VC control Hqs. 38th VCLF Bn B-25 Hospital H-20 Ldrs School X-40 Dispensary	2d NVA Div 1st VC Regt. 40th VC Bn 60th VC Bn 70th VC Bn 90th VC Bn	3d NVA Div 2d VC Regt. 93d Bn 95th Bn 97th Bn 300th Hvy Wpns Bn	107th NVA AA Bn C-18 Hos- pital C-17 Hos- pital
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83 VCLF Bn	B-27 Dispensary	Ba Lanh VCLF Sqd
H-10 Production Tm	B-28 Dispensary	Phu Khuong VCLF Sqd
Dispensary	T-2 Warehouse	500th Trans Bn
Medical Shop	T-18 Warehouse	501 Mil Staff
C Company	T-47 Linauer Unit	502 Pol Staff
C-2 Guerrilla Plt.		

5. MISSION:

a. MALHEUR I: 2-502 conducts airmobile assault into LZ's in AO on 11 May upon closure of 1-327. 2-502 conducts Search and Destroy toward the east to fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.

b. MALHEUR II-1:

(1) Phase I: 2-502 establishes fire base in west portion of BASTOGNE AO with one Battery 2-320 and one Battery 2-11 Artillery, and secures fire base with one company on D-1. 2-502 (-) remains vicinity CARENTAN Base and prepares to reinforce AO on order.

(2) Phase II: On order 2-502 (-) conducts airmobile assault into northwest portion of AO and conducts Search and Destroy operations to east and southeast. On commitment 2-502 provides one platoon OPCON 1st Bde for CARENTAN Base security.

(3) Phase III: 2-502 conducts cordon and search operations and evacuates population of Song Ve Valley south of Phase Line AMBER, commencing D-Day, H-Hour. 2-502 continues operations north of AMBER on order (tentatively D+2).

c. MALHEUR II-2:

(1) Phase I: 2-502 conducts operations to find, fix, and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps to the southwest in southeast portion of ZON AO. On order conduct cordon and search operations to evacuate civilian population of Song Ne Valley in zone. Be prepared to reinforce 1-327 or 2-327 on order.

(2) Phase II: With 1-327 and 2-327, exploit a B-52 strike on suspected enemy troop concentration in the eastern portion of ZON AO by acting as a blocking force.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. MALHEUR: 2-502 conducts airmobile assault from CARENTAN Base into assigned zone of NORMANDY AO, in order of A, B, Rcn, HHC (-), C. 2-502 conducts Search and Destroy operations to east; units will be prepared to air assault to east of AO to block. HHC (-) will secure C Battery, 2-320 Artillery. (See sketch #1).

b. MALHEUR II-1:

(1) Phase I: On D-1 C Company conducts airmobile assault from

CHAMPS Base to BS 563447 in west portion of BASTOGNE AO, and secures B Battery 2-320 Artillery and C Battery 2-11 Artillery, at FIRE BASE CHAMPS. Provides security in vicinity CARBENAN Base and prepares to reinforce BASTOGNE AO; provides one platoon Bde IAF (30 min), company (-) (1 hour), 2-320 (-) (2 hours).

(2) Phase II: 2-502 (-) conducts airmobile assault in order of B, A, Recon, CIDG, HHC (-) into BASTOGNE AO, conducts Search and Destroy operations to east and southeast. 3/A/2-502 becomes OPCON 1st Bde for base security, is also IAF for 2-502 (-) in AO (see sketch #2).

(3) Phase III: C Company establishes cordon prior to BMNT of D-Day around southern boundary of OBJ X. A Company conducts search into OBJ X from north and evacuates all VNN to collection point. CIDG blocks egress routes to west, Recon air assault from south to LZ ROMEO, BS 590515 and block egress routes to northwest. B Company continues mission of FIRE BASE CHAMPS security. A and C Company conduct cordon and search of OBJ Y and Z on order. (See sketch #2A).

c. MALHEUR II-2:

(1) Phase I: On D-2 CIDG Company moves overland back to base at Minh Long, reverts to parent unit control. On D-1 Recon conducts air move to CHAMPS, A Company (-) conducts Search and Destroy operations to arrive D-Day, leaving one platoon as Stay Behind force in north of Song Ve Valley. On D-1 B Company and Recon begin Search and Destroy operations to south and southwest from CHAMPS. A Company assumes mission of CHAMPS security and Bn IAF. On order, 2-502 prepares to evacuate civilian population of Song Ne Valley. (See sketch #3).

(2) Phase II: 2-502 blocks to south and west as 1-327 and 2-327 sweep through area where B-52 strike is to take place on 18 July. After blocking, 2-502 continues search and destroy in assigned area.

7. EXECUTION:

a. MALHEUR I: MALHEUR I was conducted from 11 May-4 June 1967. The operation began with a battalion air assault on four LZ's in the western portion of the STRIKE FORCE AO. LZ's were prepped by Artillery and Tac Air; all units closed with negative contact by 110915H and began search and destroy operations toward the east. HHC (-) secured C Battery, 2-320 Artillery at BS 617312. (See sketch #1).

From 11-12 May units continued to search the AO, making several small contacts. Many signs of recent enemy activity were noted and booby traps and gravel mines were encountered. Enemy seemed to be moving east.

On 131050H May at BS 662334, B Company accounted for 2 VC with 2 weapons, M1 and SKS. VC were moving southeast. At 1630 hrs, vicinity BS 666325 B Company made contact with 3 more VC; one of whom was wearing a steel helmet. Results was 1 VC (BC). Several other small contacts yielded 3 VC (BC) but no weapons. Units continued Search and Destroy to the east.

On 14 May C Company began to move around to B Company's left flank, still moving east. Permission was received to cross PL Chute. At 0800 hrs, at BS 673330 B Company found 6 new graves, dug up 4 bodies in black 100's, 2 in kinkis. At 0920 hrs, at BS 669305 Recondos had contact with 1 VC; results 1 VC (BC) and a Mauser. At 0930 hrs, at BS 663316 A Company killed 1 VC (BC) and captured a Mosin Nagant rifle. At 1040 hrs at BS 675334 B Company killed 1 VC (BC) with an SKS. At 1545 hrs, BS 674347 C Company dog team picked up a scent which resulted in 1 VC (BC) with carbine. Two more contacts resulted in 2 VC (BC) with 2 weapons.

On 151400H May at BS 673308, Recon had contact with 15 VC. Results were 6 VC (BC), 1 82mm mortar tube, 16 82mm rounds, SKS, and assorted small arms ammunition. At 1520 hrs, at BS 679315, A Company made contact with 3 VC. Results were 1 VC (BC), 1 SKS, 4 82mm rounds captured. All units continued to move east toward PL Riser.

On 160630H May at BS 684314 A Company sprang an ambush on 7 VC resulting in 2 VC (BC), 1 SKS, 1 Swedish K, 6 rucksacks. At 0945 hrs, at BS 691328 B Company killed 2 VC (BC) with 2 weapons. Several other contacts resulted in body count and weapons captured, including an M-16 rifle at BS 711347.

On 17 May the Recondos had several contacts vicinity BS 668317. Results were 2 VC (BC) with 2 weapons. An airstrike at BS 704311, produced negative results. A Psywar mission was flown over the AO.

On 18 May at 0920 hrs the battle of Hill 424 began with B Company in contact at BS 705322 (see sketch #1A), just north of the summit. The enemy force was well dug in and armed with automatic weapons; strength was about 20 NVA. C Company, coming to Bravo's aid from the northwest made contact with an element of the same force, also dug in on the north slope. Attack Company, moving in from the south and southwest, made contact on the south slope; again the enemy was dug into well fortified and camouflaged positions. B and C Company remained in contact until about 2030 hrs with an estimated force of 100 enemy troops. The CO of Bravo Company could not account for all of his men that night as the fighting had been close in. B Company 2d platoon was badly mauled by enemy machinegun fire. The CIDG platoon broke and ran, some being captured by VC. Flareships and airborne relay were used throughout the night.

On 190625H, A Company (-), 2-327 (OPCON 2-502) made an air assault vicinity BS 701331, to the north of Hill 424, and began sweeping to the east. The enemy force had broken into small groups and moved in that direction during the night. B Company accounted for its missing, and all units completed evacuation of KHA and WHA. A sweep of the battle areas revealed 45 enemy KIA, 16 weapons (including 4 MG's) and large amounts of material. US losses were 12 KHA and 38 WHA. Enemy fortifications on Hill 424 were mutually supporting and were the most elaborate encountered by the STRIKE FORCE in some time. For more detail on enemy bunker complexes, see Inclosure 1.

From 20-28 May 2-502 continued Search and Destroy operations to the east in its assigned AO. Many minor contacts increased the body count,



but few weapons were captured; the enemy appeared to have cased his fire-arms and broken down into small groups to exfiltrate the AO. Several air strikes were conducted by Bde in 2-502 AO, yielding negative results. Due to the number of VC and water buffalo killed in the AO, a heavy odor was being reported to spread in the valleys.

On 291610H at BS 672305, A Company engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC (BC), 1 M16 and 1 carbine.

On 301040H at BS 728808, B Company engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC (BC), 1 M-14 captured and a large amount of small arms ammunition.

On 31 May, 2-502 TAC CP was moved to the east portion of the AO (BS 732328).

From 1-4 June, units continued moving east, making minor contact. On 3 June at BS 787327, B Company found 54 tons of rice and delayed their extraction until 4 June in order to evacuate it. C Company was extracted on 3 June by air from NORMANDY AO to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future operations. A Company and Recon Force conducted Search and Destroy to TAC CP location, and were extracted with C Battery, 2-320 Artillery on 4 June. B Company was also extracted 4 June. The last element of the STRIKE FORCE arrived by air at CARENTAN Base 041631H June 1967. 2-502 conducted training and prepared for future operations.

b. MALHEUR II:

(1) MALHEUR II-1 was initiated 7 June 1967, with an airmobile assault by C Company into the west portion of BASTOGNE AO, vicinity BS 563447, and ended on 25 June with the rest of the STRIKE FORCE at that location. During the assault, C Company secured three hills allowing the insertion of B Battery, 2-320 Artillery and C Battery, 2-11 Artillery, to proceed without incident. Thus FIRE BASE CHAMPS was established; and with the help of a platoon from the 326th Engineers, fortifications and facilities were constructed. C Company began active patrolling of the area, and awaited the insertion of 2-502 (-).

On 9 June 2-502 conducted an airmobile assault into 4 LZ's in BASTOGNE AO (see sketch 2). HHC (-) moved into CHAMPS and set up the TAC CP. All assault LZ's were prepped simultaneously with Artillery and Tac Air, and units closed and moved to east and southeast out on Search and Destroy operations with negative contact. A CIDG Company, with 3 SF advisors, was lifted from Minh Long Base Camp to their LZ, and also began to Search and Destroy to east. Due to insertion on the wrong LZ, B Company suffered a delay in starting operations. One platoon of A Company was left OPCON of Bde, securing CARENTAN Base. At 1825 hrs, A Company (-) made contact with a company size enemy force, well dug in and armed with automatic weapons. Without being observed, the 1st platoon advanced to within hand-grenade distance of the enemy, and began throwing grenades into his forward trenches. A Company immediately took its first-and-only US KHA, as a faulty grenade exploded in the hand of the paratrooper who pulled the pin. The battle continued through the night; gunships and illumination

...swept. The following morning a sweep of the battle area found 17  
in caves, 3 weapons, 24 rucksacks, a large amount of medical  
(including that the enemy had been defending a hospital) and  
documents. 14 fresh enemy graves, several days old, were also  
found in the search.

On 10 June, 1130 hrs, B Company contacted a large enemy force vicinity  
BS 612463. A small advance reconnaissance party first came under heavy  
automatic weapons fire and was forced to pull back, leaving 1 paratrooper,  
1 M-60, 1 M-16, and some equipment to the enemy. By the time B Company was  
able to advance, the enemy had withdrawn, carrying the trooper-believed dead  
and the above mentioned items. Friendly losses were 1 KHA, 10 WHA and 1 MHA.

On 11 June, B Company planned an extensive sweep of the previous day's  
battle area, hoping to recover the MHA. In preparation, 5 batteries were  
employed to cover B Company's advance, and Tac Air was called in as well.  
An airborne CS attack was standing by in the event of resistance, and  
protective masks were dropped into B Company. As the Artillery began its  
fire mission at 0800 hrs, however, B Company suffered a tragic accident.  
A number of rounds fell on their position, resulting in 21 US WHA, 3 US  
KHA, and 1 scout dog KHA. Evacuation of casualties was difficult, as there  
was no LZ. The battalion surgeon and one medic rappelled from the C&C heli-  
copter into the scene and immediately provided emergency medical treat-  
ment. A CH-47 with winch finally picked up the last WHA that afternoon.  
3d Platoon, A Company, was released from Bde OPCON and inserted to rein-  
force B Company.

During the day, the CIDG Company entered the Song Ve Valley, and ac-  
cumulated over 120 men, women and children, all wishing to leave the valley.  
A CH-47 was brought in to take them to the Minh Long refugee center, but  
sniper fire prevented extraction until the following morning.

On 120950H June, at BS 614462, B Company engaged a VC squad. Result  
was 1 POW and a carbine.

On 131032H June A Company conducted a heliborne raid into the 2-327  
AO as a result of sighting 1 VC with weapon vicinity BS 613436. Results  
was 2 VC detainees, rucksacks and documents. At 1610 hrs, vicinity BS  
624451, A Company engaged 2 VC, resulting in 2 VC (BC) and a carbine. With  
the 3d Platoon back under their OPCON, A Company continued to Search and  
Destroy in the northeast portion of the AO. B Company was lifted to CHAMPS  
to secure the Fire Base, and C Company began Search and Destroy operations  
to the east, assuring B Company's assigned share of the AO. A Psywar  
team was requested to broadcast a message urging co-operation to the Song  
Ve population.

From 14-16 June, units continued to make minor contacts in the east  
of the AO, increasing the body count but capturing fewer weapons. Psywar  
broadcasts were made. Several airstrikes on suspected enemy positions  
yielded negative results.

From 17-21 June STRIKE FORCE conducted Cordon and Search operations  
aimed at clearing the civilian population and their livestock from the

Song Ve Valley. A Company and C Company performed cordon and search operations successively, while Recondo Force and CIDG elements progressed to the west and northwest. (See sketch #2A). On 18 June an informer led C Company to the remains of a weapons cache, which included 1 M16, 1 Thompson SMG, 8 rds 60mm, and other equipment. That evening A Company ambushed 2 separate parties of VC, vicinity BS 59521, resulting in 3 VC (BC), 2 weapons, and 1 82mm mortar tube. The Recondos also ambushed a small group vicinity BS 607527, killing 2 VC (BC) and capturing another 82mm tube.

During this period, Operation RAWHIDE gathered momentum, as the LRRP Platoon, OPCON 2-502, herded cattle up the Song Ve Valley from the south. By 21 June 2-502 had captured 37 POW's, evacuated over 1200 refugees to Ngia Hanh relocation center, and turned over 495 head of cattle to 1-327 for the drive to Ngia Hanh. 25 cows were given to the CIDG Company, and an element of CIDG drove them the 10 km to Minh Long. Several air-strikes in the high ground to the northwest produced negative results.

From 22-25 June 2-502 continued to Search and Destroy in northeast portion of AO. On 24 June A Company arrived at CHAMPS to assume the mission of Fire Base security. C Company began moving south in the Song Ve Valley on 25 June to get in position for the next phase of the operation, (officially called MALHEUR II-2). That evening B Company and Recondo Force began a clandestine movement to south and southwest, also in preparation for MALHEUR II-2. CIDG Company, moved overland to west, conducting search and destroy back toward their base at Minh Long. Units continued to make contacts, capturing and killing VC; but few weapons were taken.

During MALHEUR II-1 STRIKE FORCE units captured 18 weapons and killed 55 VC (BC), as well as capturing 37 VC/NVA POW's.

(2) MALHEUR II-2: Whereas MALHEUR II-1 had concentrated on the eastern portion of the AO and in particular the Song Ve Valley, MALHEUR II-2 found the 2-502 oriented toward the west and the Song Ne Valley. Leaving A Company to secure CHAMPS, B Company and the Recondo Force moved southwest on search and destroy operations. C Company continued west, and after disposing of 80 tons of rock-salt (with some CIDG help from Ba To) rendezvoused with Recondos in the Song Ne Valley. Two platoons of CIDG remained attached to C Company.

On 26 June, vicinity of BS 596401, C Company fired on 4 VC; the VC ran, leaving 3 weapons. That evening, A Company shot 3 VC (BC) at BS 600523; the VC had no weapons.

On the 30th, the C&C ship enroute to the TAC CP spotted 6 VC crossing the Song Ve, killing 3 of them.

Throughout this period leaflet drops and psywar broadcasts were conducted in the AO.

On the night of 2 July, 26 mortar rounds landed at the TAC CP. No injuries were sustained, and the attackers were immediately engaged with

and 50 caliber MG fire. That attack ceased and a patrol of 10 82mm and 10 60mm rounds next morning in the position where the VC had been firing. The rounds were armed, indicating that the VC fled in great haste. Several bloody items of equipment were discovered indicating several of the enemy had been hit.

On 3 July C Company replaced A Company at the Fire Base. A Company moved out to search and destroy toward the northeast. Continuous aggressive patrolling and **night ambushes** were conducted in the vicinity of the Fire Base by all units located there.

On 5 July A Company observed 10 VC with negative results. The next morning at BS 704477 A Company made contact with 10 VC, killing 3 and capturing 3 weapons.

On the night of 10 July, at BS 600505, the Recondos were attacked by an estimated VC company with mortar and 57mm RR fire. They suffered 19 US WHA and 2 US KHA. The enemy withdrew with unknown losses. The following day A Company moved north to block escape routes from the battle area, and B Company, 2-327 made an air assault to the Song Ve to assist. B Company, 2-327 found 6 fresh graves, presumably from the contact of the night before.

On 13 July A Company, 1-327 moved by air to the TAC CP to take over the mission of Fire Base security.

On 17 July units began moving into blocking positions to the south and west of Nui Coi Mountain, in the east portion of the AO. The 1-327 and 2-327 were blocking on the north and east, and would sweep through the area after a B-52 strike on the 18th. The LRRP's were OPCON to the 2-502 for this phase. The 2-327 made some contact as it swept south, but no major enemy units were engaged.

On 19 July, acting on intelligence received from Brigade Headquarters, A Company 1-327 conducted a raid at BS 571472. Expecting to find a VC hospital, they encountered instead a POW compound, containing 22 Vietnamese prisoners. (For full report on the compound and prisoner identity, see Inclosure #2).

On 21 July, 6 National Police were attached to the LRRP's for the purpose of interdicting and questioning traffic on the road from Ba To to the sea coast. As elements of 2-502 began once more to search and destroy in the AO, A Company was given the mission of checking out a piece of high ground to the east, which intelligence sources indicated held an enemy unit of battalion size belonging to the 1st VC Regiment.

After careful search of the area and several small contacts, one of which resulted in the killing of a VC battalion commander, A Company discovered several base camp sites, which were destroyed. This search over, Brigade ordered that A Company reverse its direction and sweep to the west and northwest in close coordination with B Company, 2-327. This produced negative results. On the afternoon of 27 July, Brigade again ordered A Company to change direction and search out the area vicinity BS 675455, which was located in the 2-327 AO. A senior VC sergeant had been captured and had definite information that his battalion was based

in that location. Getting in as close as possible, A Company staked out and moved off at daylight to hit the reported base camp. Thorough search of the area produced nothing. During these several days A Company killed 10 VC and captured 5 weapons in 4 small encounters.

On 27 July a POW led C Company to a weapons cache containing a 30 caliber MG, 60mm mortar, and a carbine, as well as other items of military nature.

On the afternoon of 28 July, the 2-502 was extracted from its AO by chopper, and closed on CARBENTAN Base Camp after 51 days of combat operations.

## 8. RESULTS:

### a. MALHEUR I:

#### (1) Friendly Losses:

US KHA: 13  
US WHA: 65  
US MHA: 0  
US CHA: 0  
WPN/EQUIP: None

#### (2) Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (BC): 133  
NVA KIA (BC): 19  
VCC: 0  
NVAC: 3  
DETAINEES: 6  
WPN/EQUIP: 15 SKS, 8 carbines, 6 Mosin Nagants, 2 M-1, 2 MAS-36, 1 SW .38 pistol, 1 82mm mortar tube, 1 French SMG, 2 Chicom SMG, 1 M-16, 1 modified 50 SMG, 1 .45 pistol, 1 German 7.92 LMG, 1 modified 49 SMG, 1 semi-auto weapon (type unknown), 1 flamethrower, 2 PPSH 41, 9 Chicom grenades, 19 rds 82mm, numerous documents, medical supplies, 2 radios (type unknown), numerous rucksacks, 54 $\frac{1}{2}$  tons rice, miscellaneous equipment, and assorted ammo.

### b. MALHEUR II:

#### (1) Friendly Losses:

US KHA: 10  
US WHA: 74  
US MHA: 1  
US CHA: 0  
WPN/EQUIP: None

#### (2) Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (BC): 175  
NVA KIA (BC): 4

KBA: 6  
VCC: 40  
NVAC: 0  
DETAINEES: 161  
REFUGEES: 1742

WPN/EQUIP: 10 carbines, 60mm mortar complete, 1 30 cal MG with tripod, 2 type 50 modified, 1 Mauser, 1 Mat 49 modified, 3 M-1, 5 SKS, 1 light SMG, 4 Mosin Nugant, 1 Thompson SMG, 5 MAS, 2 AK-47, 4 shot-guns, 1 1903 Springfield rifle, 1 automatic weapon, 1 IAW, 2 flare pistols, 2 US 45 cal pistols, 1 SMG type unknown, 2 82mm mortar tubes, 1 BAR, 4 rds 81mm mortar ammo, 31 82mm mortar rds, 1 57mm RR rd, 3 82mm mortar bases, 2 60mm sights, 1 82mm mortar bipod, 1 scope, 3 M5 fuses, 1 HMG tripod, 1 rifle grenade (WP), 6 US grenades, 4 Chicon grenades, 1 tube for Butterfly bomb, 18 rds 60mm mortar ammo, 2 walkie talkie radios, 2 trip flares, 6 PRC type radios, 3 TH312 telephones, 1 switchboard with 10-15 jacks, 15 flashlight batteries, 1 PRC 10 radio, 3 long antenna bases, 1 short antenna base, 1 long antenna, 4 transistor radios, 2 tripods, 1 mile commo wire, 1 tape recorder with tape, 12 bicycles, 45 assorted fuses and tubes, RPD magazine, 8 BAR magazine, 500 rds SKS ammo, 750 rds 30 cal ammo, 60 tons salt, 9½ tons rice, 1 ton corn, surgical equipment, medical supplies, numerous rucksacks, assorted ammo, assorted clothing, assorted documents, and 1 bugle.

#### 9. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. General: The series of missions followed the normal pattern of air assaults, search and destroy and blocking roles. The concept and execution of these missions had no extraordinary features other than the length of the operation which ran to 49 days of continuous combat operations. The neutralization of enemy base camps was, however, a major feature of this operation.

In some cases the guidance provided by Brigade Headquarters was conflicting even though received on the same day. The value of coordination visits are recognized but the information must be 100% consistent.

The effectiveness of a lengthy operation of this nature should be compared to the effects of malaria, fevers, fatigue and a general loss of troop resistance to these infections. This is particularly applicable when units are operating in low valley floors which are or have been inhabited by local population and their animals. The incidence of disease from these conditions appears disproportionately high.

#### b. Conduct of Combat Operations

(1) Bn control of companies: A rigidly enforced system of boundary changes and the ensuing exchange of information must be established. Situations developed where the battalion agreed to a boundary shift by liaison visit without completing an overlay. Getting such information to the companies over the radio net by giving a trace is difficult and subject to error. Units in close proximity, either internal or external must be conclusively advised of nearby units to avoid inadvertent contacts between

friendly forces. Companies or battalions operating in close proximity require frequent and close communication to include transmitting on one another's internal nets. The close coordination of all fires is mandatory under these conditions. Further, the clearance to place any type fires in a company AO must be only with the approval of the responsible company commander.

(2) Airmobile extractions require further refinement. The number of aircraft and the ACL must be specified prior to the pickup and adhered to closely. In several extractions performed by this battalion changes were given to the company commander as the ships landed.

Ground company commanders are not capable of altering aircraft loads at the last minute particularly if the helicopter is landing. Voice and radio communications are ruled out by noise. Consideration should be given to smaller flights with a 10 minute time lag between flights. There appears no valid reason for conducting an airmobile extraction in the same format as an airmobile assault.

(3) Employment of air cav platoon (prov). See Inclosure 3.

(4) Fires: Artillery and Air.

(a) Artillery: Fire mission requests are not expedited as quickly and accurately as required. A battery fire for effect request has been, on occasion, responded to with two pieces firing six or eight rounds each because of an acknowledged round dispersion. In some cases fire missions have been delayed because of aircraft along the gun target line. Further steps should be taken to preclude aircraft interference with tactical fire mission requirements. Additionally check fires must be honored immediately.

(b) Tac Air: The preplanned and immediate air requests were promptly and accurately delivered. Skyspot missions were effective in the H & I role.

c. Logistics: The length of time to complete a firefly resupply mission demands close examination. In some instances 7-9 hours were required to complete a shuttle resupply. On a 3 or 4 day cycle this delay causes a serious waste of daylight mission time. Consideration should be given to the use of CH-47's or a flight of three HU-1D's to perform the delivery on a one try basis. Only one HU-1D would be required to return and pickup the empty mermite containers in two hours. The company could then be on the march after only a two hour delay.

d. Communication: Terrain considerations reoccurred as a fundamental principle. The use of relays was required on occasion and in some instances a company CP was forced to compromise a desired location in terms of optimum platoon control in order to maintain communication with battalion. First echelon maintenance in the field continues to require command supervision. Fifty day operations strongly reinforce this requirement particularly when there is no maintenance float available.

The secure net proved to have many advantages in speed and clarity of

coordination. Its continuous dependability must be improved upon. Stricter attention must be given to security on the other nets since the security net has a tendency to relax net security in general.

e. Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs:

(1) Coordination problems exist in the performance of loudspeaker and leaflet drops. Brigade level missions provided the better response in loudspeaker runs and standard issue leaflet drops. The units conducting refugee control and evacuation as well as Chieu Hoi appeals must be advised in detail of the message context in order to perform properly. No information or misinformation to the troops can fault the entire purpose of the mission. The psywar missions flown by higher headquarters complicate rather than contribute to the battalion mission. There is inadequate liaison between the requesting unit (including brigade) and the 244 Psy Ops Company. The Psy Ops Company program does not appear to be coordinated between province, Special Forces units, JUSPAO, and the combat unit in the AO. There is no exchange of information as to content and time of the missions. Closer monitoring and coordination is indicated if the program is to be compatible with the battalion combat mission.

(2) Civil Affairs: The refugee problem was the central point of the civil affairs activity. Population control was effected reasonably well with the execution of Ba To District. That failure to enforce refugee evacuation led to repeated and unnecessary flights. The civil affairs objective requires a more clear cut definition in the future.

100 CIVIC ACTION:

During Operation MALHEUR I, MALHEUR II, and MALHEUR II-2, the following civic affairs/civic action operations were accomplished by this battalion. The evacuation of innocent civilians from the Song Ve Valley area (center of mass BS 6050).

(1) A total of 1404 refugees (138 men, 550 women, and 716 children) were airlifted from the Song Ve Valley area to the refugee camp at Nghia Hahn District Headquarters.

(2) A total of 520 head of cattle were driven from the valley area to the Nghia Hahn refugee camp.

(3) A total of 7 VCC and 51 VCS were detained at the collection point.

(4) The collection point for the refugees was highly mobile, located in shady areas with access to water facilities, and consisted of the following personnel:

(a) 10 MP's used to control the people at the collection point and to guard suspected VCS.

(b) 15 man security team used to establish local security around the collection point.



(c) A ground Psy\*War Team and one 3 man Vietnamese Psy-War Team were used to call the people into the collection point and to explain what was required of them.

(d) A National Policeman (GVN), a 3 man province reconnaissance team, and the assistant Village Chief of the area were allowed to mingle among the people, answering questions, and allaying their fears as to where they were going, and what their future would be.

(e) An MI Team was utilized for on the spot interrogation of suspected VC personnel. This allowed the innocent civilians to remain with their families and alleviated confusion at higher levels.

(f) A medical team was used to give on the spot treatment, and to tag persons that would require treatment at the refugee center. A total of 165 persons were treated.

(g) Two interpreters, a LZ control team, and a livestock control team completed the personnel at the collection point. The livestock control team was used to drive the herd; the local population has not had sufficient experience to control a sizable herd on the move, nor the sense of urgency to move at the necessary pace.

The evacuation of innocent civilians from the Song He Valley area (center of mass BS 6040).

(1) A total of 388 refugees, (30 men, 117 women, and 191 children) were evacuated from the valley area to the Refugee Camp at Nghia Hahn. The evacuation of their families as a lever to bring the local guerrillas in.

(2) The innocent civilians were urged in leaflet drops, ground Psy-War broadcasts and air-broadcasts to come into the collection point in the Song Ve Valley, and in the Song He Valley. They were urged to move to the refugee camp at Ba To.


(3) A total of 2,000,000 leaflets, 30 hours of air broadcasts, and 25 hours of ground broadcasts were used in the operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EDWARD THROCKMORTON  
LIE, Infantry  
Adjutant

Inclosures-3

NORMANDY AD



PL MIDFIELD  
PL CUOTE




SKETCH 1

MILBARK I - ASSAULT & INITIAL DEPLOYMENT  
OF 2-502 IN AD 11-14 MAY

HILL 424


50

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



HILL 424  
 Contacts of 18 May  
 Sketch 1A

- Air Assault of 9 June and  
 Initial Deployment of 2-502(A)  
 LHO AB Including Contacts of  
 9th June -



Sketch 2





Sketch 3

Incloume 1 - After Action Report, MALHEUR

2. Bunker complexes encountered by 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Infantry

1. During Operation MALHEUR I, the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 502d Infantry encountered several sizable bunker complexes. Two of these complexes were still occupied by the enemy, two other very extensive complexes were vacant but had apparently been recently used. These complexes were situated on heavily wooded slopes within a hundred meters of a water source and appeared to afford the enemy 360° security. Mutually supporting bunkers located throughout these areas, ingeniously camouflaged, in several cases, were not visible until within 5 meter range. Built low to the ground and with overhead cover they appeared capable of withstanding all but a direct hit by air and artillery.


2. The purpose of this report is to describe one of these bunker complexes. The troopers who encountered the particular complex in this report were awed by its layout, defensive capabilities, and completeness. Comments were obtained from the officers of the company who discovered the complex and sketches and diagrams were made by the engineer platoon leader attached to the "STRIKE FORCE".

3. The area is west of Duc Pho on Nui Con Vu<sup>1</sup> (coordinates BS 707352) or Hill 399. It consists basically of five separate areas (see sketch 1). It is estimated that the facilities were adequate to provide for 200 personnel. Nineteen bunkers capable of sleeping between 8-10 men were scattered about the area. Surrounding the sleeping bunkers were fighting holes--generally two holes per bunker. These were situated to provide all around security (see sketch 2). Overhead cover consisted of two layers of logs covered by dirt. Aperatures were just above ground level covering cleared fields of fire. The sleeping bunkers had bomb shelters--each containing a dog leg that led to a lower level. Artillery fire did not appear to penetrate to this depth. The classroom area consisted mainly of an open bleacher type affair, estimated to accomodate 75 personnel. The instructor would stand in the middle and instruct to both sides. A crude sand table was centered within the classroom (see sketch 4). A kitchen was located adjacent to a small stream. Halved bamboo poles were used as ledges to collect water. Sanitary conditions appeared to be adequate (see sketch 5).


4. A complex such as this requires a considerable amount of time and labor to construct, yet the enemy has shown a surprizing willingness to abandon these positions.

19 BUNKERS

2 FOX HOLES PER BUNKER







NEW AREA

PERMANENT PARTY

HILL  
TOP


KITCHEN

OFFICERS & NCO'S



CADRE

CLASSROOM  
& TRAINING  
AREA

LAYOUT OF AREA





V.C. CLASSROOM




HOLES

KITCHEN

TOP VIEW



SIDE VIEW



SUBJECT: VC POW Compound


On 19 July 1967, as a result of intelligence reports, 2d Battalion (Airborne) 502d Infantry conducted a raid on a VC Prisoner of War camp. The raid was carried out by 1st and 3rd platoons of A Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 327th Infantry which were under the operational control of the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 502d Infantry.

At 0900 the raiding force encountered numerous punji stakes Southeast of the objective. As they entered the camp at 0930 they were fired upon by two bursts of enemy automatic weapons fire. Paratroopers returned fire, but could not observe the enemy who apparently fled Northwest.

Breaking down the gates they found ten Vietnamese in the courtyard, three of whom were female. A detailed search revealed 12 additional Vietnamese who were in ankle stocks in the Northernmost hut used for prisoner's quarters (See sketch Incl #1); a 12 gauge Ithica pump shotgun was in the tunnel adjacent to the guards' mess; two cans of rice (approx 80 lbs) were located in hut #4; ten-100 lb bags of corn and approximately two tons of rice in baskets were hidden in a cave (#1 on sketch). Numerous documents were found in disorder in hut #5.

The fence and prisoners quarters were constructed of trees (approximately three inches in diameter) lashed together vertically. The remaining huts were constructed of mud, thatched grass, and mats.

The Camp Commander's hut contained a bed, two desks, and a chair. One room of the guard's hut contained eight sleeping mats and four rucksacks, another room contained a bed, desk, shelf, and rifle rack for eight rifles. The kitchen consisted of an earthen oven and numerous crud cooking utensils. The prisoners mess contained six stand-up eating tables. The guards hut contained two eating tables with benches; an additional small table and benches were positioned along three of the walls.




1. Cave with one ton corn and two tons rice.
2. Hooch with cooking pot.
3. Storage tunnels.
4. Storage hooch.
5. Camp C.O.s Quarters.
6. Punji pits.
7. Storage hooch.
8. Guards Quarters.
9. Kitchen
10. Prisoners Mess
11. Guards Mess
12. Prisoners Quarters
13. Trench 4' deep
14. Courtyard


NOTES:

- Fence surrounding camp 8' high. All ground within 10' of fence (inside and outside) covered with punji stakes.
- Trail from south was entry route-guards fled north.

# PRISONER'S QUARTERS



ANKLE STOCKS



INCL #2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 502D INFANTRY  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96347

AVBD-CA

23 July 1967

SUBJECT: Roster of Recaptured Personnel

The following were recaptured personnel of Vietnamese origin, repatriated from VC captivity by the 2d Bn (Abn) 502d Inf, 19 July 1967, location BS 570470:

TRAN BA                                      Age: 68                                      Sex: Male  
From: Ky Tho (H), Nghia Hung (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured by VC: May 67  
Remarks: Subject was captured because his two sons (1 Sgt & 1 Cpl) were in the ARVN.

TRINH NGOC BUU                              Age: 17                                      Sex: Male  
From: Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: Feb 67  
Remarks: PF, Pvt in Mobile Plt. Was member of PF until Dec 66.

NGUYEN DIET                                      Age: 34                                      Sex: Male  
From: Hoa Vinh (H), Nghia Phuoc (V) Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: Feb 67  
Remarks: Was suspected by VC of giving info to ARVN.

TRINH TRUNG DINH                              Age: 40                                      Sex: Male  
From: Thu Xa (H), Tu Thanh (V), Tu Nghia (D)  
Captured: Oct 66  
Remarks: VC came to his hamlet Youth Association, (No connection with military), was a civilian working there.

HO DUY DUC                                      Age: 38                                      Sex: Male  
From: Pho Lan Tay (H), Nghia Thuan (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: 17 Jul 65  
Remarks: Subject was hamlet chief since 1954-65, and also teacher.

NGUYEN HUU HUAN                              Age: 25                                      Sex: Male  
From: Dong Duong (H), Son Long (V), Son Tinh (D)  
Captured: 5 May 66  
Remarks: Subject was former member of 316th Co 42d Bn, Quang Qnai Province, RF Unit, (Cpl-Sqd Ldr, SN 390174).

Incl #3



AVBD-CA

23 July 1967

SUBJECT: Roster of Recaptured Personnel

NGUYEN THI KIYN

Age: 58

Sex: Female

Captured: Feb 67

From: Kim Than Thuon (H), Nghia Loc (V)

Remarks: ARVN were starting operation in Feb 67, she gave ARVN info and people of her hamlet informed VC.

NGUYEN THI XUAN LAN

Age: 42

Sex: Female

From: Bun Thua (H), Nghia Thuan (V), NH (D)

Captured: 30 Mar 67

Remarks: Subject has two sons in ARVN 25th Div and one younger brother in the ARVN. Subject was captured because she sent her sons to join the ARVN so the VC couldn't force them to become VC.

VO LAP

Age: 64

Sex: Male

From: Kim Thanh Thuon (H), Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)

Captured: 30 Sep 66

Remarks: Subject provided food for ARVN and also info.

NGUYEN, LUA

Age: 37

Sex: Male

From: Hoa Vinh (H), Nghia Phuoc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)

Captured: 24 Mar 67

Remarks: Subject was imprisoned by VC for giving information to ARVN.

DO MAN

Age: 62

Sex: Male

From: Xuan Dinh (H), Nghia Thanh (V), Nghia Hanh (D)

Captured: 16 May 65

Remarks: Subject was finance cadre for GVN and has two sons in the ARVN.

NGUYEN THI NHU

Age: 67

Sex: Female

From: Nghia Lan (H), Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)

Captured: 12 Feb 67

Remarks: Subject son was a PF Plt Ldr in Nghia Hanh (D), it was best Plt in District. Subject was captured because her son was outstanding Plt Ldr.

LE VAN NGUON

Age: 17

Sex: Male

From: Kim Thuon (H), Nghia Loc (V)

Captured: Feb 65

Remarks: Subject work for 1Lt of the 25th Div. He was a laborer.

NGUYEN TAN NHO

Age 34

Sex: Male

From: Dong Vinh (H), Nghia Loc (V)

Captured: 24 Jan

Remarks: Subject was a PF from 1958-1963 for hamlet and district. Thereafter active in Hamlet Security Affairs.

23 July 1967

## SUBJECT: Roster of Recaptured Personnel

LE VAN OANH   Age: 20                                 Sex: Male  
From: Kim Thanh Ho (H), Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: Mar 67  
Remarks: Captured because his father is the Asst Village Chief.

NGUYEN VAN PHUONG   Age: 20                                 Sex: Male  
From: Nghia Lam (H), Nghia Loc (V)  
Captured: 10 Jul 66  
Remarks: Civilian aided PF.

CAO THANH   Age: 62                                 Sex: Male  
From: Nhan Loc (H), Nghia Phu (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: Mar 67  
Remarks: Captured because his 3 sons are ARVN soldiers.

DONG THONG   Age: 67                                 Sex: Male  
From: Dong Vinh (H), Nghia Loc (V)  
Captured: 23 Feb 67  
Remarks: Subject has been hamlet chief for 9 years.

TRUONG MAU TONG   Age: 41                                 Sex: Male  
From: Dong Vanh (H), Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: Mar 67  
Remarks: Secretary for Hamlet Chief.

LUONG TRUYN   Age: 16                                 Sex: Male  
From: An Hoa (H), Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: Feb 67  
Remarks: VC suspected him of giving info to PF.

NGUYEN CONG   Age: 25                                 Sex: Male  
From: Dong Vanh (H), Nghia Loc (V), Nghia Hanh (D)  
Captured: 16 Mar 67  
Remarks: Lost his arm in May of 66 in a battle with VC when a PF.

Incident 3 - After Action Report, MALHEUR

Subject: Air Cav Employment

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT OF AIR CAV PLAT (PROV)

ORGANIZATION:           2 IOH  
                          2 Gunships  
                          6 Slicks and 1 Infantry Platoon

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

A surveillance area is selected by the Bn CO and a joint map recon is then conducted by the CO and the Cav Platoon leader. Normally the mission is specified as locating, fixing, and destroying of small enemy groups. The technique is for the IOH's or ground OP's to locate these groups or individuals and for the gunships to contain them while the Infantry Platoon is landed near the sighting to capture or destroy the enemy and their weapons.

In today's experiment two variations were used. A company sized unit was employed as a pushing force, to force movement and evacuation of the Song Ve River Valley. A fixed observation post was inserted along expected routes of march movement. This addition provided a significant advantage in locating potential targets without prior alerting of the enemy groups. For example a permanent 4.2" mortar OP located 3 VC in the open. The gunships were requested away from the Cav platoon mission temporarily and killed two enemy before departing for fuel. After leaving the area five additional VC attempted to remove the bodies. Artillery fire adjusted from the OP prevented evacuation although the additional VC were not themselves destroyed. In this instance the infantry platoon remained at brigade rear and was not landed and therefore cannot be fully evaluated in terms of the design capability.

COMMENT

The employment of an Air Cav Platoon as OPCON to the battalion increases the battalion capabilities to control the AO and to pick up isolated groups of enemy. When used in conjunction with the line companies and fixed observation posts the capability is markedly improved.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Increase the availability of the Air Cav Platoon or OPCON to the battalion.
2. Specify the total time of OPCON prior to the mission.
3. Establish the location for the infantry platoon ground alert in the battalion AO and not at Brigade rear in order to cut the reaction time.
4. Require the air cav platoon to operate on the company command net in whose area an exploitation is being conducted.

**Inclosure 3 - After Action Report, MALHEUR (cont'd)**

5. Require the observation and gunships to remain on station until released by the company commander when they are operating in the company AO.